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Abstract
Cooperative games provide a framework to study cooperation
among self-interested agents. They offer a number of solu-
tion concepts describing how the outcome of the cooperation
should be shared among the players. Unfortunately, computa-
tional problems associated with many of these solution con-
cepts tend to be intractable—NP-hard or worse. In this pa-
per, we incorporate complexity measures recently proposed
by Feige and Izsak (2013), called dependency degree and su-
permodular degree, into the complexity analysis of coopera-
tive games. We show that many computational problems for
cooperative games become tractable for games whose depen-
dency degree or supermodular degree are bounded. In partic-
ular, we prove that simple games admit efficient algorithms
for various solution concepts when the supermodular degree
is small; further, we show that computing the Shapley value
is always in FPT with respect to the dependency degree. Fi-
nally, we note that, while determining the dependency among
players is computationally hard, there are efficient algorithms
for special classes of games.
1 Introduction
Cooperative games provide a convenient framework to study
cooperation among self-interested agents. Formally, a coop-
erative transferable utility game, or simply a game, is a pair
(N, v)whereN = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of players and
v : 2N → R is a characteristic function. We are interested
in how players should divide the value v(N) of the grand
coalition N . To capture the idea of a stable or fair payoff
division scheme, a number of solution concepts have been
developed, such as the core and the Shapley value. Unfor-
tunately, the computational problems associated with many
of these solution concepts are often intractable—NP-hard or
worse.
There are two ways to circumvent computational in-
tractability in this context. The first approach is to iden-
tify interesting classes of games that admit efficient algo-
rithms. For instance, it is well-known that when the char-
acteristic function v is convex, an outcome in the core can
be computed by a polynomial-time algorithm. However, this
algorithm offers no guarantees when the input game is not
convex, even if the convexity constraint is only violated at
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a few points, and hence this approach is of limited value.
A more flexible way to cope with hardness is to provide
complexity guarantees for all instances so that the guaran-
tee depends on the complexity of the instance, that is, to de-
sign algorithms whose running time depends on how well
the input instance is structured. In the context of coopera-
tive games, this approach has been pursued by Ieong and
Shoham (2005), who propose a representation formalism,
which they call marginal contribution nets (MC-nets), and
design an algorithm for computing an allocation in the core
whose running time depends on the treewidth of the graph
associated with theMC-net representation of the input game.
In this work, we explore the power of the latter ap-
proach for two measures of structural complexity of set
functions that have been recently developed by Feige and
Izsak (2013): the dependency degree and the supermodu-
lar degree. Intuitively, the complexity of a set function v is
measured using the notion of dependency among players at
v; such dependencies induce a graph describing the relation
between players—the dependency graph. A player’s depen-
dency degree is her degree in this graph; her supermodu-
lar degree is her degree in a modified version of this graph,
which only takes certain dependencies into account.
Our contribution. We argue that both the dependency de-
gree and the supermodular degree are useful in the context of
cooperative games, both analytically and computationally.
We show that several cooperative game theory concepts
can be naturally interpreted in terms of a dependency graph.
In particular, a players’ dependency degree reflects on her
importance in the game: in a simple game, a dummy player
is an isolated vertex of the dependency graph and a veto
player is a vertex with the maximum degree. We can also re-
late properties of a game, such as its dimension, to the prop-
erties of its dependency graph: for instance, we show that de-
pendency graphs of weighted voting games are clique-trees,
namely, chordal graphs.
We then investigate which solution concepts in coop-
erative games can be computed efficiently if the depen-
dency/supermodular degree is bounded. For simple games,
we obtain a number of tractability results with respect to
the supermodular degree. Specifically, we prove that sim-
ple games admit an efficient algorithm for computing an el-
ement of the core or the least core when the supermodular
degree is small. Further, while finding an optimal coalition
structure is computationally intractable even for weighted
voting games, we show that this problem becomes tractable
for weighted voting games with small supermodular degree.
However, these results do not extend to general games: we
prove that the associated separation problem for the least
core is NP-hard even for games with constant dependency
degree. On the other hand, we show that computing the
Shapley value and the Banzhaf value is in FPT with respect
to the dependency degree.
We also consider the problem of computing the depen-
dency degree and the supermodular degree given various
representations of a game. While intractability turns out to
be inevitable in general, we provide polynomial and pseudo-
polynomial algorithms for special classes of games.
Relatedwork. Computational aspects of cooperative games
have received a considerable amount of attention over the
last few decades; we refer the reader to the book of Chalki-
adakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge (2011).
Our work is similar in spirit to the complexity study of in-
duced subgraph games or, more broadly, games defined by
MC-nets (Deng and Papadimitriou 1994; Ieong and Shoham
2005; Greco et al. 2011; 2014; Li and Conitzer 2014). In-
deed, each MC-net induces an agent graph, which also
aims to capture dependencies among agents. However agent
graphs are defined in a purely syntactic manner, by looking
at agents’ co-occurrences in the rules of an MC-net, whereas
the dependency graph is defined semantically, i.e., in terms
of the value of the characteristic function. Moreover, both
the dependency degree and the supermodular degree are dif-
ferent from the concepts that are usually used to measure the
complexity of an agent graph (such as treewidth).
There are also similarities between our model and My-
erson games (Myerson 1977; Chalkiadakis, Greco, and
Markakis 2016; Meir et al. 2013; Igarashi 2017) where play-
ers are located on a graph and coalitions are only allowed
to form if they are connected in this graph. However, in
Myerson games non-adjacent agents may still depend on
each other, and hence an agent’s dependency degree may
be high even if her degree in the underlying Myerson graph
is small. As a consequence, some problems that are easy
for games with small supermodular degree remain hard for
games on bounded-degree graphs, even if these graphs are
acyclic (Igarashi 2017). Our results for coalition structure
generation (Section 6) are similar in spirit to those of Voice,
Polukarov, and Jennings (2012); we discuss the relationship
between their results and ours in Section 6.
The dependency degree and the supermodular degree
have been introduced by Feige and Izsak (2013), who
showed applications of these measures to the welfare max-
imization problem. Feldman and Izsak (2014) general-
ized these results to function maximization subject to k-
extendible system constraints (a generalization of the inter-
section of k matroids). These concepts have also been ap-
plied in an online setting (Feldman and Izsak 2017), and in
the context of efficiency of auctions (Feldman et al. 2016),
optimization of SDN upgrades (Poularakis et al. 2017) and
committee selection (Izsak 2017). Some related complexity
measures are the submodularity ratio (Das and Kempe 2011)
and MPH (Feige et al. 2015).
2 Preliminaries
We start by defining basic notation and terminology of co-
operative games. Recall that a cooperative game is a pair
(N, v), where N is a finite set and v is a function from
2N to R. Throughout the paper, we assume v(∅) = 0. For
s ∈ N, let [s] = {1, 2, . . . , s}. For a vector x ∈ Rn and
a subset S ⊆ N we use the notation x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi,
with the convention that x(∅) = 0. The subsets of N are
referred to as coalitions. An imputation for a game (N, v)
is a vector x ∈ RN satisfying efficiency : x(N) = v(N),
and individual rationality : xi ≥ v({i}) for every i ∈ N .
For a player i ∈ N and a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i}, we let
v(i|S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S), that is, v(i|S) is the marginal
contribution of i to S. A player i is called a dummy if she
does not contribute to any coalition, i.e., v(i|S) = 0 for ev-
ery S ⊆ N .
A set function v : 2N → R is said to be monotone if for
every pair of subsets S, T ⊆ N it holds that S ⊆ T implies
v(S) ≤ v(T ). A game (N, v) is said to be simple if v is
monotone and only takes values in {0, 1}. In a simple game,
coalitions of value 1 are said to be winning, and coalitions of
value 0 are said to be losing. A winning coalition S is said to
be minimal if removal of any player from S makes it losing,
i.e., S \ {i} is losing for every i ∈ S. A player i is said to
be a veto player if she is present in all winning coalitions,
i.e., if a coalition S is winning, then i ∈ S. A player i is a
pivot for a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} if S is losing and S ∪ {i}
is winning.
The core is a classic solution concept in cooperative
games. Formally, the core of a game (N, v) is the set of all
imputations x such that no coalition has an incentive to de-
fect from x, i.e., x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N . As the core
can be empty, and, on the other hand, not all outcomes in the
core are equally fair, we consider the least core, which can
be thought of as the set of most stable outcomes. We first
define the excess of a coalition S ∈ 2N \ {N, ∅} at an im-
putation x as e(x, S) := v(S) − x(S); intuitively, e(x, S)
is the degree of unhappiness of S at x. The least core of a
game (N, v) is the set of all imputations x that minimize the
maximum excess, i.e., the set of optimal solutions x of the
following linear program:
(LP0) min ε
s.t. x(S) ≥ v(S)− ε for all S ∈ 2N \ {N, ∅}
xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N
x(N) = v(N).
We also consider solution concepts capturing fairness
among players: the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value.
The Shapley value φi(N, v) of a player i ∈ N in a game
(N, v) is the average of i’s marginal contributions at v over
all permutations of the players, that is,
φi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
v(i|S).
The Banzhaf value is the average of i’s marginal contribu-
General games Simple games Weighted voting games
Optimal coalition structure NP-h. NP-h. for p = 6 (Th. 11) FPT wrt p (Cor. 2)
Core P P
Least Core FPT wrt p (Th. 5) FPT wrt p
Shapley FPT wrt d (Th. 8) FPT wrt d FPT wrt d
Banzhaf FPT wrt d (Th. 9) FPT wrt d FPT wrt d
Table 1: Overview of complexity results for computing various solution concepts when parameterized by the dependency degree d and the
supermodular degree p. Note that deciding the non-emptiness of the core for a simple game is straightforward: the core is non-empty if and
only if there is a veto player (Chalkiadakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge 2011).
tions at v over all coalitions, that is,
βi(N, v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
v(i|S).
Computational setting Throughout the paper, we only con-
sider games (N, v) such that v is computable in time poly-
nomial in n. Furthermore, ‘polynomial’ always means poly-
nomial in the number of players n. Note that the explicit
representation of a game (N, v), which lists the values of
all coalitions, is not polynomial in n; thus, for our compu-
tational results for general games we assume oracle access
to the characteristic function v. We say that a problem is
fixed parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to a parameter
k if each instance I of this problem can be solved in time
f(k)poly(|I|), where f is a computable function that de-
pends on k only.
We omit some proofs due to space constraints; the omitted
proofs can be found in the full version of the paper (?).
3 Dependency Graphs of Cooperative Games
In this section, we introduce complexity measures repre-
senting dependencies among players in a cooperative game
(Feige and Izsak 2013), and study how well such parameters
capture important concepts in cooperative games.
Given a game (N, v) and two players i, j ∈ N , we say
that player i positively depends on player j if there exists a
coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j} such that v(i|S ∪ {j}) > v(i|S),
i.e., i can contribute more to S in the presence of j. We say
that i depends on j if there exists a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j}
such that v(i|S ∪ {j}) 6= v(i|S), i.e., i’s contribution to
S depends on the presence of j. These relations are known
to be symmetric (Feige and Izsak 2013); hence, we can cap-
ture the dependency relations between players by undirected
graphs. Formally, we define the supermodular dependency
graph G+v to be an undirected graph where the set of nodes
is given by N and the set of edges is given by the pairs of
players positively depending on each other. The supermod-
ular dependency set of i at v is
D+(i) = { j ∈ N \ {i} | i positively depends on j }.
The supermodular degree p of v : 2N → R is defined as
the maximum size of the supermodular dependency set, i.e.,
p = maxi∈N |D+(i)|. We define the dependency graph Gv
to be an undirected graph where the set of nodes is given
by N and the set of edges is given by the pairs of players
depending on each other. The dependency set of i at v is
D(i) = { j ∈ N \ {i} | i depends on j }.
The dependency degree d of v : 2N → R is defined
as the maximum size of the dependency set, i.e., d =
maxi∈N |D(i)|.
Example 1. Consider a simple game (N, v) with player
set N = [4] and a characteristic function v : 2N →
{0, 1} where the set of minimal winning coalitions is
{{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 4}}. It is easy to see that only
such pairs have a positive dependence. Further, player 1
depends on player 3 since 1 can make a positive marginal
contribution to the coalition {2, 4}, but her contribution be-
comes zero in the presence of 3. A similar argument applies
to the pair 2, 4. The resulting dependency graphsG+v andGv
are depicted in Figure 1.
1 2
34
(a) The graph G+
v
1 2
34
(b) The graph Gv
Figure 1: A supermodular dependency graph and a dependency
graph (Example 1)
We will now show that the parameters defined above cap-
ture the importance of a player in the underlying game. The
theorem below shows that a dummy player corresponds to
an isolated node in the dependency graph.
Theorem 1. For every cooperative game (N, v) and every
player i ∈ N , the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Player i is a dummy player.
(ii) v({i}) = 0 andD(i) = ∅.
(iii) v({i}) = 0 andD+(i) = ∅.
Proof. (i) =⇒ (ii): Suppose that i is a dummy player. Then
we have v({i}) = 0. Now, suppose that there exists a player
j ∈ D(i). Then there is a coalition S such that at least one
of v(i|S) and v(i|S∪{j}) is non-zero, contradicting the fact
that i is a dummy player.
(ii) =⇒ (iii): This direction holds by the definition.
(iii) =⇒ (i): Suppose that v({i}) = 0 and D+(i) = ∅.
Assume towards a contradiction that v(i|S) 6= 0 for some
coalition S ⊆ N \ {i}. Let S∗ be a minimal coalition with
respect to this property. If S∗ 6= ∅, then there is a player
j ∈ S∗ such that v(i|S∗ \ {j}) = 0, which means that i can
contribute more in the presence of j, and hence i positively
depends on j, a contradiction. If S∗ = ∅, it follows that
v({i}) 6= 0, a contradiction again.
Positive Dependence in Simple Games
We will now further investigate the structure of dependency
graphs in simple games. It turns out that such games can be
almost fully characterized by the positive dependence rela-
tion. We first observe that in simple games the dependency
relation admits a natural interpretation.
Lemma 1. Consider a simple game (N, v) and two players
i, j ∈ N . Player i positively depends on player j if and only
if there exists a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i, j} such that S ∪{i, j}
is winning, but the coalitions S∪{i} and S∪{j} are losing.
Now, in contrast with dummy players, a veto player in a
simple game is adjacent to every non-dummy player in the
dependency graph.
Theorem 2. Let i be a veto player in a simple game (N, v).
Then i positively depends on each non-dummy player j ∈
N \ {i}.
Proof. Take any non-dummy player j ∈ N \ {i}. Then j
is a pivot for some coalition S ⊆ N \ {j}, i.e., S ∪ {j} is
winning and S is losing. Since i is a veto player and i 6= j,
we have i ∈ S. Let S−i = S \ {i}. Then, the coalition
S−i ∪ {i, j} is winning, and coalition S−i ∪ {i} is losing.
Also, as i 6∈ S−i ∪ {j}, coalition S−i ∪ {j} is losing. By
Lemma 1, we conclude that i positively depends on j.
We also observe that all minimal winning coalitions cor-
respond to cliques in the supermodular dependency graph.
Theorem 3. In a simple game (N, v) player i ∈ N posi-
tively depends on a player j ∈ N if and only if there exists
a minimal winning coalition S ⊆ N such that i, j ∈ S.
Proof. Suppose that i positively depends on j. By Lemma 1
there exists a coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} such that S ∪ {i, j}
is winning, but coalitions S ∪ {j} and S ∪ {i} are losing.
Choose a minimal coalition S∗ with respect to this prop-
erty. Then, removing any player from S∗∪{i, j}makes this
coalition losing, and hence S∗ ∪ {i, j} is a minimal win-
ning coalition. Conversely, suppose that i, j belong to some
minimal winning coalition S. Since S is a minimal winning
coalition, both S \ {j} and S \ {i} are losing, but S is win-
ning. By Lemma 1, i positively depends on j.
Corollary 1. Consider a simple game (N, v) and a minimal
winning coalition S ⊆ N . Any two distinct players i, j ∈ S
positively depend on each other.
Weighted voting games form a subclass of simple games.
Such games can be succinctly represented by the weight of
each player, and a quota. Formally, a weighted voting game
with a set of players N = [n] is given by a list of non-
negative weights w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) and a quota q; we
will write [N ;w; q]. Its characteristic function v : 2N →
{0, 1} is given by
v(S) =
{
1 if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q
0 otherwise.
It turns out that the supermodular dependency graph of a
weighted voting game has a special structure: we will show
that any such graph is a chordal graph. Recall that a graph
is said to be chordal if any cycle of four or more nodes has
a chord, i.e., an edge that does not belong to the cycle, but
connects two of its nodes.
We first state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider a weighted voting game [N ;w; q]
where a player i ∈ N positively depends on a player k ∈ N
and wi ≥ wj ≥ wk. Then, player i positively depends on
player j.
Proof. Since i positively depends on k, there is a coalition
S such that S ∪ {i, k} is winning, but S ∪ {i} and S ∪ {k}
are losing. Now, since wi ≥ wj ≥ wk, S∪{i, j} is winning,
but S∪{i} and S∪{j} are losing, implying that i positively
depends on j.
Theorem 4. For every weighted voting game [N ;w; q] it
holds that its supermodular dependency graph is chordal.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that G+v has a
chordless cycle C of at least four players. Let C =
{i1, i2, . . . , ik}, where ij positively depends on ij+1 for
j ∈ [k] (with the convention that ik+1 = i1). Assume with-
out loss of generality that i1 has the maximumweight among
the players in C and wi2 ≤ wik .
First, suppose that there is a player ij ∈ C \ {i1, i2, ik}
such that wij ≥ wi2 . Since i1 positively depends on i2 and
wi1 ≥ wij ≥ wi2 , by Lemma 2 this means that i1 posi-
tively depends on ij , a contradiction. Now suppose that for
all players ij ∈ C \ {i1, i2, ik} we have wij < wi2 ; in par-
ticular, we have wik−1 < wi2 . Since ik positively depends
on ik−1, and wik ≥ wi2 ≥ wik−1 , by Lemma 2 player ik
positively depends on i2, a contradiction.
A simple game (N, v) is the intersection of k weighted
voting games [N ;wℓ; qℓ], ℓ ∈ [k], if for every coalition
S ⊆ N we have v(S) = 1 if and only if wℓ(S) ≥ qℓ
for all ℓ ∈ [k]. It is known that every simple game G can
be represented as an intersection of multiple weighted vot-
ing games; the minimum number of weighted voting games
whose intersection equals toG is called the dimension ofG.
Observe that the game defined in Example 1 has dimen-
sion 2: it can be represented as the intersection of weighted
voting games [N ;w1; 1] and [N ;w2; 1], where w1(1) =
w1(3) = w2(2) = w2(4) = 1, and all other weights are
zero. However, its supermodular dependency graph has a
chordless cycle of length four; thus, we cannot guarantee
that the supermodular dependency graph of a simple game
is chordal beyond dimension 1.
4 Complexity of Stability-Related Solution
Concepts
In this section, we investigate the complexity of computing
outcomes in the core and the least core.
For simple games, it is well-known that deciding if the
core is not empty or finding an outcome in the core is easy.
We now complement this result by showing that comput-
ing an element of the least core in simple games is fixed-
parameter tractable with respect to the supermodular degree.
Theorem 5. Let (N, v) be a simple game. Given its super-
modular dependency graph G+v and oracle access to v, we
can compute an element of the least core in FPT time with
respect to the supermodular degree.
Proof. We first check whether the input game admits an im-
putation, i.e., whether v(N) ≥
∑
i∈N v({i}): if not, the
least core is empty. Thus, from now on we assume that
v(N) ≥
∑
i∈N v({i}).
It suffices to show that the separation problem for the lin-
ear program LP0 is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to
the supermodular degree. Fix an ε ∈ R and x ∈ RN . First,
we can clearly check in polynomial time whetherx is an im-
putation; thus, in the rest of the proof we assume that this is
indeed the case. We need to show that deciding whether the
following inequality holds is in FPT with respect to p:
min{ x(S)− v(S) | S ∈ 2N \ {N, ∅} } ≥ ε. (1)
Since x is an imputation, we have x(N) ≤ 1 and xi ≥ 0
for all i ∈ N . Now, by non-negativity of x and by the fact
that x(S) ≤ 1 for all S ⊆ N , the term on the left can be
rewritten as
min{ x(S)− v(S) | S ∈ 2N \ {N, ∅} }
= min{ x(S)− 1 | S ∈ M},
where M is the set of all minimal winning coalitions in
2N \ {N, ∅}. It remains to show that the computation of
min{ x(S) − 1 | S ∈ M} is in FPT with respect to the su-
permodular degree. Fix i ∈ N and letM(i) denote the set of
all coalitions inM including i. By Corollary 1, these coali-
tions are subsets of D+(i) ∪ {i}, i.e.,M(i) ⊆ 2D
+(i)∪{i}.
By iterating through all i ∈ N and all subsets ofD+(i)∪{i},
we can compute the valuemin{ x(S)− 1 | S ∈ M}.
When the dependency graph has degree at most 2, Feige
and Izsak (2013) showed that demand queries can be an-
swered in polynomial time; that is, given a characteristic
function v : 2N → R and a vector x ∈ RN , one can ef-
ficiently compute a subset S∗ maximizing v(S∗) − x(S∗)
over any subfamily of 2N . This allows us to obtain the fol-
lowing result.
Theorem 6. Consider a game (N, v) whose dependency de-
gree is at most 2. Given oracle access to the characteristic
function v, we can decide the non-emptiness of the core or
find an element of the least core in time polynomial in n.
Proof. We will argue that the separation problem for LP0
can be solved in time polynomial in n. Consider an ε ∈ R
and a vector x ∈ RN . Again, one can decide whether x is
an imputation in time O(n). Now, if the dependency degree
is at most 2, it follows from the work of Feige and Izsak
(2013) that the maximum value v(S)−x(S) over coalitions
in S ∈ 2N \ {N, ∅} can be computed in time polynomial
in n; thus, we can compare the maximum with the given ε
and efficiently decide whether (ε,x) satisfies the inequali-
ties in LP0.
It remains to notice that the imputations in the core are
exactly the optimal solutions to LP0 with ε replaced with
the value 0, i.e., we can use the same procedure as above to
decide whether the core is non-empty.
However, this argument does not extend to general coop-
erative games: we will now demonstrate that there is a suc-
cinctly representable class of games for which the separation
problem for LP0 is NP-hard, even though the dependency
degree of games in this class is bounded by a small constant
and their supermodular degree is 1,
Theorem 7. There exists a family of hypergraph games with
dependency degree 7 and supermodular degree 1 for which
the separation problem for LP0 is NP-hard.
Proof. An instance of 3-REGULAR INDEPENDENT SET is
given by a 3-regular graph G and an integer k; it is a ‘yes’-
instance if G has an independent set of size at least k and
a ‘no’-instance otherwise. This problem is known to be NP-
hard (Garey and Johnson 1979). We will now show how to
reduce it to the separation problem for LP0 for a family of
hypergraph games defined below. For every vertex v ∈ V ,
we introduce two players v1, v2, and let N = {v1, v2 |
v ∈ V } ∪ {d1, d2}. We define a set function v by build-
ing its hypergraph representation H = (N,EH , w), so that
for each S ⊆ N the value v(S) is computed as the sum
of the weights of all hyperedges of the sub-hypergraph in-
duced by S. We set w(u) = 0 for each u ∈ N . For each
v ∈ V we connect v1 and v2 by an edge (i.e., a hyperedge
of rank 2) of weight 3, and we connect d1 and d2 by an
edge of weight |V |/2. For every edge e = {u, v} ∈ E, we
introduce a hyperedge of size 4 and weight −1 containing
u1, u2, v1 and v2. Since G is 3-regular, |E| = 32 |V | and
hence v(N) = 3|V | − 32 |V | +
1
2 |V | = 2|V |. Moreover, the
constructed game has dependency degree d = 7 since G is
3-regular, and there is a pair of dependent vertices for every
vertex inG. Also, the supermodular degree p of this game is
1, as the supermodular dependency set of every vertex only
contains the other vertex belonging to the same pair.
Now, we set x∗u = 1 for each u ∈ N \ {d
1, d2} and x∗d1 =
x∗d2 = 0. Clearly, the vector x
∗ is an imputation, as we have
v(N) = x∗(N) = 2|V | and the constraint x∗i ≥ v({i}) is
satisfied for every i ∈ N .
It can be shown that G admits an independent set of size
k if and only if the maximum excess at x∗ is at least k+ |V |2 .
Indeed if I ⊆ V is an independent set of size k in G, then
{v1, v2 : v ∈ I} ∪ {d1, d2} is a coalition whose excess at
x
∗ is k + |V |/2. Conversely, it can be argued that if there
is a coalition whose excess at x∗ is k + |V |2 then G has an
independent set of size k.
5 Complexity of the Shapley and Banzhaf
Values
For the Shapley and Banzhaf values, the following observa-
tion is crucial for our analysis: for every player i and every
coalition C ⊆ N \ {i} it holds that adding players who do
not depend on i to C does not affect i’s marginal contribu-
tion to C. We formalize this observation in the following
lemma. We write I(i) = N \ (D(i) ∪ {i}).
Lemma 3. For every S ⊆ D(j) and for every T ⊆ I(j) it
holds that v(j|S ∪ T ) = v(j|S).
Proof. We prove our claim by induction on the size of
the set T . The claim clearly holds when |T | = 1. Sup-
pose it holds for |T | ≤ k − 1. Let T = {i1, i2, . . . , ik}.
Then v(j|S ∪ {i1, i2, . . . , ik−1}) = v(j|S) by the induction
hypothesis and v(j|S ∪ {i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik}) = v(j|S ∪
{i1, i2, . . . , ik−1}) by the fact that ik ∈ I(j). Combining
these two equations yields
v(j|S ∪ T ) = v(j|S ∪ {i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik}) = v(j|S).
By Lemma 3, one can calculate the Shapley value of each
player by iterating over all subsets of her dependency set,
computing her marginal contribution, and counting the num-
ber of coalitions whose intersection with the dependency set
is exactly this subset.
Theorem 8. Computing the Shapley value is in FPT with
respect to the dependency degree.
Proof. The Shapley value can be written as follows:
φi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
v(i|S),
=
1
n!
∑
S⊆D(i)
∑
T⊆I(i)
|S ∪ T |!(n− |S ∪ T | − 1)!
n!
v(i|S ∪ T ),
=
1
n!
∑
S⊆D(i)
v(i|S)
n−|S|−1∑
t=0
α(S, t),
where α(S, t) =
(
n−|S|−1
t
) (|S|+t)!(n−|S|−t−1)!
n! . The last
equality holds due to Lemma 3.
Similarly, the Banzhaf value can be efficiently computed
when the dependency degree is bounded.
Theorem 9. Computing the Banzhaf value is in FPT with
respect to the dependency degree.
Proof. The Banzhaf value can be written as follows:
βi(N, v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
v(i|S),
=
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆D(i)
∑
T⊆I(i)
v(i|S ∪ T ),
=
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆D(i)
v(i|S) 2(n−|S|−1),
where the last equality holds due to Lemma 3.
6 Optimal Coalition Structure Generation
So far, we discussed games without coalition structures: we
implicitly assume that all players cooperate and are willing
to divide the value of the grand coalition. In some settings,
however, it may be more efficient to split the players into
different teams. The problem of finding the best partition of
players, which is referred to as the optimal coalition struc-
ture generation problem, has thus been extensively studied
(see, e.g., the surveys (Elkind, Rahwan, and Jennings 2013;
Rahwan et al. 2015)). Formally, a coalition structure for N
is a partition π = {S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ} of N into disjoint coali-
tions. A coalition structure π for N is said to be optimal if
the social welfare
∑
S∈π v(S) is maximized.
Not surprisingly, optimal coalition structure generation is
NP-hard even for weighted voting games; this can be shown
by a straightforward reduction from PARTITION (Chalki-
adakis, Elkind, and Wooldridge 2011). In contrast, we will
now argue that if the input game is simple and its supermod-
ular dependency graph has tree-like structure, this problem
becomes tractable. To this end, we introduce the notions of
tree decomposition and treewidth.
Definition 1. A tree decomposition of a graph G is a pair
(T, (Xt)t∈V (T )), where T is a rooted tree and (Xt)t∈V (T )
is a family of subsets of V (G), called bags, where
(i) for every node i ∈ V (G), the setX−1(i) := { t ∈ V (T ) |
i ∈ Xt } is nonempty and connected in T , and
(ii) for every edge {i, j} ∈ E(G), there is a node t ∈ V (T )
such that i, j ∈ Xt.
For a node t of T , we let Vt be the union of all bags
present in the subtree of T rooted at t, including Xt. The
treewidth of a tree decomposition (T, (Xt)t∈V (T )) of G is
maxt∈V (T )(|Xt| − 1).
Recall that for simple games it holds that minimal win-
ning coalitions form cliques in the supermodular depen-
dency graph.We will now argue that this implies that there is
an optimal coalition structure where each winning coalition
is contained in some bag of the tree decomposition.
Lemma 4. Let (N, v) be a simple game and let
(T, (Xt)t∈V (T )) be a tree decomposition of the supermod-
ular dependency graph G+v . For every t ∈ V (T ) it holds
that every optimal coalition structure π for Vt can be trans-
formed into another optimal coalition structure π′ so that
for each coalition S ∈ π′ the following statements hold:
(i) if S contains a player x with x ∈ Xt \Xt′ for every child
t′ of t, then S ⊆ Xt.
(ii) S can appear in only one subtree, i.e., if S∩Xt is a subset
of both Xt1 and Xt2 for some children t1, t2 of t, then
S ⊆ Vt1 or S ⊆ Vt2 .
Proof. Consider a node t ∈ V (T ). Note that every optimal
coalition structure can be transformed into another optimal
coalition structure where each winning coalition is minimal.
Thus, let π be such an optimal coalition structure for Vt.
Take an arbitrary coalition S ∈ π. If S is losing, then it is
clear that S can be divided into S ∩ Xt and S ∩ (Vt′ \Xt)
for each child t′ of t without changing the sum
∑
S∈π v(S),
and hence our claims hold. Now, suppose that S is a minimal
winning coalition. By Theorem 3, S forms a clique.
To show (i), suppose that there is a player x ∈ S such
that x ∈ Xt \ Xt′ for every child t′ of t. Assume towards
a contradiction that S 6⊆ Xt and hence there is a player
y ∈ S \Xt. Observe that no bag Xw, w ∈ V (T ), contains
both x and y, since x is not present inXt′ for any successor
t′ of t, and y does not appear above t. However, since S is
a clique, x is adjacent to y in the graph G+v , which means
that there is a bag containing both x and y. This contradicts
requirement (ii) of Definition 1.
To show (ii), suppose that S ∩Xt is a subset of bothXt1
andXt2 for some children t1, t2 of t. Assume towards a con-
tradiction that S 6⊆ Vt1 and S 6⊆ Vt2 ; thus there exist a player
x ∈ S \ Vt1 and a player y ∈ S \ Vt2 . Since the intersec-
tion S ∩Xt is fully contained in both Vt1 and Vt2 , we have
x, y 6∈ Xt, and hence no bag contains both x and y. How-
ever, since S is a clique, x and y are adjacent, contradicting
requirement (ii) of Definition 1.
By Lemma 4, one can find an optimal coalition structure
for a simple game by trying all possible partitions of each
bag and combining them in a bottom-up manner. Before we
present the proof of Theorem ??, we need a few auxiliary
definitions.
Consider a cooperative game (N, v) and a coalition struc-
ture π for this game. For each subset S ⊆ N , we define
π(S) to be the coalition in π containing S if such a coalition
exists, and π(S) = ∅ otherwise.
A tree decomposition (T, (Xt)t∈V (T )) of a graph G is
nice if for the root r of T we have Xr = ∅, and each node
belongs to one of the following types:
• Leaf: t is a leaf in T and |Xt| = 1.
• Introduce: t has one child t′, and Xt = Xt′ ∪ {x} for
some x 6∈ Xt′ .
• Forget: t has one child t′, and Xt = Xt′ \ {x} for some
x ∈ Xt′ .
• Join: t has two children t1, t2 such thatXt = Xt1 = Xt2 .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. Consider a simple game (N, v). There exists
an algorithm that, given oracle access to v and a tree decom-
position (T, (Xt)t∈V (T )) of the supermodular dependency
graphG+v with treewidth tw, computes an optimal coalition
structure in time O((tw + 1)tw+14tw+1|V (t)|).
Proof. First, recall that in tw2n time we can transform a
given tree decomposition of treewidth tw with n nodes into
a nice one with the same treewidth tw and O(tw · n) nodes
(Cygan et al. 2015). In what follows, let (T, (Xt)t∈V (T ))
denote such a decomposition.
Now, we give a dynamic program over the tree decom-
position as follows. For each node t ∈ V (T ), each coali-
tion structure π of Xt, and each subset πout of π, we de-
fine opt[t, π, πout] to be the maximum value
∑
S∈π∗ v(S)
such that π∗ is a coalition structure of Vt where all the coali-
tions in π are extended in π∗ without changing the coali-
tions in π \ πout, i.e., for all S ∈ π, S ⊆ π∗(S), and for
all S ∈ π \ πout, S = π∗(S). Starting from the leaves and
going up to the root, we will fill out the dynamic program-
ming table. The case where t is a leaf corresponds to the
base case of the recurrence; we then compute values for a
non-leaf node t based on the values for the children of t. We
will finally obtain opt[r, {∅}, ∅], which is the value we want
to compute.
Leaf: If t is a leaf node, then we have only one value
opt[t, {Xt}, {Xt}] = opt[t, {Xt}, ∅] = v(Xt).
Introduce: Suppose t is an introduce node with child t′
such that Xt = Xt′ ∪ {x}. Let Sx be a coalition in π con-
taining x, and let π′ = (π \ {Sx}) ∪ {Sx \ {x}}. We claim
that opt[t, π, πout] is given by the value of an optimal coali-
tion structure of the subtree rooted at the child t′ and the
marginal contribution of x to the coalition Sx \{x}, namely,
opt[t, π, πout] = opt[t
′, π′, π′out] + (v(Sx)− v(Sx \ {x})),
where π′out = πout \ {Sx}.
To see this, let π∗ be a partition of Vt that attains the
maximum in the definition of opt[t, π, πout] and satisfies
condition (i) of Lemma 4. Since x ∈ Xt \ Xt′ , we have
Sx ⊆ Xt and hence Sx ∈ π∗. Then, it follows that π∗∗ =
(π∗ \ {Sx}) ∪ {Sx \ {x}} is a partition considered in the
definition of opt[t′, π′, π′out], and we have
∑
X∈π∗∗ v(X) ≤
opt[t′, π′, π′out]. Hence,
opt[t, π, πout] =
∑
X∈π∗∗
v(X) + (v(Sx)− v(Sx \ {x}))
≤ opt[t′, π′, π′out] + (v(Sx)− v(Sx \ {x})).
Conversely, let π∗ be a partition of Vt′ that attains the
maximum in the definition of opt[t′, π′, π′out]. Then, since
Sx \ {x} ∈ π′, but Sx \ {x} 6∈ π′out, the coalition Sx \ {x}
remains the same in π∗, i.e., Sx \ {x} ∈ π∗; thus, parti-
tion π∗∗ = (π∗ \ {Sx \ {x}}) ∪ {Sx} is considered in the
definition of opt[t, π, πout], and
opt[t, π, πout] ≥
∑
X∈π∗∗
v(X),
=
∑
X∈π∗
v(X) + (v(Sx)− v(Sx \ {x})),
= opt[t′, π′, π′out] + (v(Sx)− v(Sx \ {x})).
Forget: Suppose t is a forget node with child t′ such that
{x} = Xt′ \Xt. Then, it can be verified that opt[t, π, πout]
is given by
max{ opt[t′, πS , πSout] | S ∈ πout ∪ {∅} },
where πS = (π \ {S}) ∪ {S ∪ {x}} and πSout = (πout \
{S}) ∪ {S ∪ {x}} for S ∈ πout ∪ {∅}.
Join: Finally, suppose that t is a join node with children
t1, t2 such thatXt = Xt1 = Xt2 . Then, opt[t, π, πout] is the
maximum value of
opt[t1, π, π
1
out] + opt[t2, π, π
2
out]−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
over all the pairs (π1out, π
2
out) where πout is a disjoint union
of π1out and π
2
out; intuitively, each π
i
out specifies how a coali-
tion in πout will be extended to subtrees Vt1 and Vt2 .
To show the correctness of our algorithm, let π∗ be a par-
tition of Vt that attains the maximum in the definition of
opt[t, π, πout] and satisfies condition (ii) of Lemma 4.
Let πin be the set of coalitions in π that remain the same,
i.e., πin = π \ πout. Observe that by condition (ii) of
Lemma 4, each coalition S ∈ πout either remains the same
in π∗ or is extended to a subtree rooted at t1 or t2, that is,
π∗(S) ⊆ Xt or π∗(S) ⊆ Vti for some i = 1, 2. We now di-
vide πout into two families π
1
out and π
2
out depending on how
S ∈ πout has been extended in π∗; specifically, we let π1out
and π2out be subsets of πout such that πout can be represented
as a disjoint union of π1out and π
2
out, and
• π1out includes all the coalitions S in πout such that π
∗(S) is
contained in Vt1 only, i.e., π
∗(S) ⊆ Vt1 and π
∗(S) 6⊆ Vt2 ;
and
• π2out includes all the coalitions S in πout such that π
∗(S) is
contained in Vt2 only, i.e., π
∗(S) ⊆ Vt2 and π
∗(S) 6⊆ Vt1 .
Let π1in = πin ∪ π
2
out, π
2
in = πin ∪ π
1
out. For i = 1, 2, set
πi = πiin∪{ π
∗(S) | S ∈ πiout }∪{S ∈ π
∗ | S ⊆ Vti \Xt }.
Note that each πi consists of πin, the coalitions π
∗(S) ∩
Xt with S ∈ πout being extended to another subtree, the
coalitions in π∗ that traverse both Xt and Vti \Xt, and the
coalitions in π∗ that are fully contained in Vti \ Xt; hence,
it can be easily verified that πi is a partition of Vti . Now, the
optimal value opt[t, π, πout] can be written as follows:
opt[t, π, πout]
=
∑
S∈πin
v(S) +
∑
S∈π∗\πin
v(S)
= 2
∑
S∈πin
v(S) +
∑
S∈πout
v(S) +
∑
S∈π∗\πin
v(S)−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
=
∑
S∈π1
in
v(S) +
∑
S∈π2
in
v(S) +
∑
S∈π∗\πin
v(S)−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
=
∑
S∈π1
v(S) +
∑
S∈π2
v(S)−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
≤ opt[t1, π, π
1
out] + opt[t2, π, π
2
out]−
∑
S∈π
v(S).
Conversely, let π1out and π
2
out be subsets of πout such that
πout can be represented as a disjoint union of π
1
out and π
2
out.
Suppose that for each i = 1, 2, πi is a partition of Vti that
attains the maximum in the definition of opt[ti, π, π
i
out]. Let
πin be the set of coalitions in π that should be preserved, i.e.,
πin = π \ πout, and let πiin be the set of coalitions in π that
remain the same in πi, i.e., πiin = π \ π
i
out for each i = 1, 2.
We define
π∗ = πin ∪ (π
1 \ π1in) ∪ (π
2 \ π2in).
That is, π∗ consists of πin, the coalitions in π
i that have been
extended in each Vti , and the coalitions in π
i that are fully
contained in Vti \ Xt; hence, it can be verified that π
∗ is a
partition of Vt. By a similar calculation as above,
opt[t1, π, π
1
out] + opt[t2, π, π
2
out]−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
=
∑
S∈π1
v(S) +
∑
S∈π2
v(S)−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
=
∑
S∈π1
in
v(S) +
∑
S∈π2
in
v(S) +
∑
S∈π∗\πin
v(S)−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
= 2
∑
S∈πin
v(S) +
∑
S∈πout
v(S) +
∑
S∈π∗\πin
v(S)−
∑
S∈π
v(S)
=
∑
S∈πin
v(S) +
∑
S∈π∗\πin
v(S)
=
∑
S∈π∗
v(S) ≤ opt[t, π, πout].
The overall running time of our algorithm is
O((tw + 1)tw+14tw+1|V (t)|),
since the size of the dynamic programming table is
O((tw + 1)tw+12tw+1|V (t)|) and each entry can be filled
in O(2tw+1) time. This completes the proof.
Voice, Polukarov, and Jennings (2012) also studied the
problemof finding an optimal coalition structure for a graph-
restricted instance, and designed a O(twtw+O(1)n) algo-
rithm for a graph with treewidth tw when players discon-
nected on a graph do not depend on each other. In our set-
ting, the result of Voice, Polukarov, and Jennings (2012)
translates into an efficient algorithm for finding an optimal
coalition structure for games whose dependency graph has
bounded treewidth. However, this result does not imply ours,
since Theorem 10 is for games whose supermodular depen-
dency graph has bounded treewidth, and the supermodular
dependency graph is a subgraph of the dependency graph.
Recall that a chordal graph always admits a clique-tree
decomposition, i.e., a tree decomposition where each bag
forms a maximal clique; moreover, such a decomposition
can be found in linear time (Berry and Simonet 2017). Hence
the treewidth of a chordal graph is bounded by the maximum
degree of the graph, and we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. There exists an algorithm that, given a
weighted voting game [N ;w; q] and its supermodular de-
pendency graph, computes an optimal coalition structure in
time O((p + 1)p+14p+1(p+ 1)n).
Our FPT result with respect to the supermodular degree
does not extend to arbitrary simple games; indeed, for such
games we obtain a hardness result that holds even if the su-
permodular degree is bounded by a constant (see the supple-
mental material for the proof).
Theorem 11. Finding an optimal coalition structure of a
simple game is NP-hard even if the supermodular degree is
at most 6.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-complete problem EXACT-
3-COVER (X3C) (Garey and Johnson 1979). Given a set
of elements X = {x1, x2, ..., x3n} and a family S =
{S1, S2, ..., Sm} of three-element subsets of X , this prob-
lem asks whether X can be covered by n sets from S. This
problem remains NP-complete if for each element x ∈ X its
frequency px = |{S ∈ S | x ∈ S }| is at most 3.
Given a set of elementsX = {x1, x2, ..., x3n} and a fam-
ily S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} of three-element subsets of X
where px ≤ 3 for each x ∈ X , we construct a simple game
G = (N, v) where N = X , and for each subset S ⊆ N , we
set v(S) = 1 if there exists a set Sj ∈ S such that Sj ⊆ S,
and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Notice that every player belongs
to at most three minimal winning coalitions and hence pos-
itively depends on at most six players by Theorem 3. It is
immediate that an optimal coalition structure has value n if
and only ifX can be covered by n sets from S.
7 Constructing Dependency Graphs
In this section, we explore another question: if the depen-
dency graph is not given to us as input, how hard is it to
compute the dependency/supermodular degree?
An interesting class of games where constructing depen-
dency graphs is easy is induced subgraph games. Formally,
an induced subgraph game with a set of players N is given
by an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a weight function
w : E → R. For each S ⊆ N the value v(S) of a coalition S
is given by the sum of edge weights in the graph induced by
S. In such games, player i depends on player j if and only
if the edge (i, j) has non-zero weight; furthermore, their de-
pendence is positive if and only if the weight is positive.
However, for general games constructing the dependency
graph is not easy. As we have seen before, a dummy player
corresponds to an isolated vertex of both dependency and su-
permodular dependency graphs; decidingwhether a player is
a dummy is NP-hard, for instance, in weighted voting games
(Chalkiadakis, Elkind, andWooldridge 2011) or in threshold
network flow games (Bachrach and Rosenschein 2008). This
immediately implies the hardness of constructing a super-
modular dependency graph or a dependency graph for these
classes of games. On the positive side, for weighted voting
games we can determine if there is a dependency between
players in pseudo-polynomial time.
Theorem 12. Given a weighted voting game [N ;w; q] with
integer weights and players i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, one can
decide whether i depends on j in time polynomial in n and
wmax, where wmax is the maximum weight among the play-
ers.
Proof. We need to check if there is a coalition S ⊆ N\{i, j}
such that (a) coalition S ∪ {i, j} is winning, but coalitions
S ∪{i} and S ∪{j} are losing, or (b) coalitions S ∪{i} and
S∪{j} are winning, butS is losing. Note that condition (a) is
equivalent to q−(wi+wj) ≤ w(S) < min{q−wi, q−wj},
and condition (b) is equivalent to max{q − wi, q − wj} ≤
w(S) < q. Both conditions can be checked by considering
at most wmax weights, and, for each weight, checking ifN \
{i, j} contains a coalition of that weight; the latter question
is effectively an instance of SUBSET SUM and hence can be
answered in pseudo-polynomial time.
One can also ask if it is possible to construct the de-
pendency graph by evaluating the characteristic function
at polynomially many points. However, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, the query complexity of the dependency graph turns
out to be exponential in the number of players.
Theorem 13. Any algorithm that computes the dependency
graph of a simple game must evaluate the characteristic
function in at least
(
n
n/2
)
points in the worst case.
Proof. We will describe a class of simple games where(
n
n/2
)
value queries are required to decide whether a player
is a dummy.
Let n be an even number, and set X = [n]. We introduce
one new player a 6∈ X . For each subsetH ⊆ [n] with |H | =
n/2, we construct a simple game GH = (N, vH). The player
set in this game isN = X∪{a}, and vH(S) = 1 if and only
if |S ∩X | ≥ n2 and S 6= H or if S = H ∪ {a}. Notice that
player a is not a pivot for any coalition in GH except forH .
We also define a game G0 = (N, v0), where N = X ∪ {a}
and v0(S) = 1 if and only if |S ∩ X | ≥
n
2 . Clearly, a is a
dummy in G0.
Consider any algorithm that constructs a dependency
graph using value queries. If it asks fewer than
(
n
n/2
)
queries,
then there is a coalition H ⊆ X with |H | = n/2 whose
value has not been queried. Now suppose that whenever the
algorithm queries the value of a coalition of size n/2, the
answer is 1. Then at the end the algorithm is unable to dis-
tinguish between GH and G0, and hence it is unable to decide
whether a is a dummy.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we have demonstrated that the concepts of de-
pendency degree and supermodular degree are useful in the
analysis on cooperative games: we have obtained FPT re-
sults with respect to these parameters for a number of so-
lution concepts in cooperative game theory. We have also
explored the limitations of this approach, proving hardness
results for games where these parameters are bounded by a
constant. In the future, it would be interesting to extend this
line of work to other solution concepts, such as the nucleo-
lus, the kernel, or the bargaining set, or to other succinctly
representable classes of cooperative games.
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